Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2017-2018

Article 14

October 2017

City of Helena v. Community of Rimini
Molly M. Kelly
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, molly.kelly@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, State and Local
Government Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kelly, Molly M. (2017) "City of Helena v. Community of Rimini," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol.
0 , Article 14.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss8/14

This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

City of Helena v. Community of Rimini, 388 Mont. 1, 397 P.3d 1,
(Mont. 2017)
Molly M. Kelly
After twenty years of adjudication, the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed the City of Helena’s right to 13.75 cfs from Ten Mile Creek, the
city’s primary water source. The Court found a statute allowing cities and
municipalities to exercise water rights that have gone through extended
periods of nonuse did not need a retroactive clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the City of Helena claimed water rights dating from the
1860s, despite prolonged periods of non-use.1 Andy Skinner and the
Community of Rimini, both junior water rights holders to Ten Mile Creek,
objected.2 In 2005, the Montana Legislature amended the water rights
claims statutes and formally recognized municipality nonabandonment
despite periods of nonuse, if certain criteria were met. The objectors
argued the 2005 amendment to the municipality non-use exception was
impermissibly retroactive and needed a retroactivity clause as required by
the Montana Code.3 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and found the
amendments permissible because they were procedural, rather than
substantive.4 The Court recognized the Montana Legislature’s codification
of the “growing cities doctrine.”5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the 1800s, miners used water from Tenmile Creek near Helena,
Montana for silver mining.6 When they no longer had use for the
appropriated water, some miners sold their water rights to the Helena
Water Works Company.7 A 1903 decree declared the Helena Water Works
Company (“Company”) the owner of the first two rights on Tenmile
Creek.8 Taken together, the two water rights total 550 miner’s inches
(“MI”), and have a flow rate of 13.75 cubic feet per second (“cfs”).9
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At the time of the decree to the Company, it was using two points of
diversion from the stream.10 The first point diverted through an open ditch,
into a water treatment facility, and then went through two sixteen-inch
pipelines to the City of Helena (“City” or “Helena”).11 The City replaced
the open ditch in 1922 with an eighteen-inch concrete diversion pipeline
called the “Rimini Pipeline.”12 The Rimini Pipeline’s capacity is 13.15
cfs.13 After construction, and after the City stopped utilizing the Yaw Yaw
ditch (described below) for municipal purposes, all of Helena’s Tenmile
Creek diversions flowed through the Rimini Pipeline.14 Helena’s total
claim is 13.75 cfs, so Rimini Pipeline’s 13.15 cfs capacity is 0.60 cfs less
than Helena’s entire Tenmile Creek water rights.15
The second original point of diversion was downstream of the
treatment facility, diverting through an open channel called the Yaw Yaw
ditch.16 In 1919, after Helena acquired the Company’s facility and water
rights, it ceased using the Yaw Yaw ditch for municipal purposes.17 The
City continued to lease the ditch for agricultural purposes and maintain the
facilities for emergencies.18
In 1929, the City commissioned an engineering report that
identified restricted capacity for the two sixteen-inch pipelines, which
limited their capacity to 5.50 cfs.19 In 1948, the City built a new twentyfour-inch pipeline with a capacity of 13.75 cfs.20 This enabled the City to
divert 13.15 cfs through the Rimini Pipeline, through the treatment facility,
and then through the new twenty-four-inch pipeline to Helena.21
The City filed water rights claims for the two rights in 1982.22
Andy Skinner, a junior water rights holder, and the Community of Rimini,
objected to the City’s claims.23 Twenty years of adjudication culminated
in this decision.
In 2011, Water Master Hugh B. McFadden, Jr. (“Master”) found
against the City’s claims to the entire water rights from the two original
rights. He found that the City abandoned 7.35 cfs of its rights to Tenmile
Creek.24 In 2013, the Water Court held that the Master erred because he
did not consider Montana’s presumption of municipal nonabandonment
statute.25 On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, the case was
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remanded to address “procedural errors and ambiguities in the Water
Court’s order.”26 On remand, the Water Court reversed and found the City
abandoned their water rights under the common law, but ordered briefs on
abandonment under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4).27 After the parties
composed briefs on the issue, the Water Court held that under the
nonabandonment statute, “evidence established a presumption that the
City did not intend to abandon 7.35 cfs.”28 The Water Court also found
that the City abandoned 0.60 cfs in the Rimini Pipeline, the difference
between the 13.15 cfs capacity of the pipeline and 13.75 cfs, the capacity
decreed.29 Skinner appealed and the City cross-appealed.30
III. ANALYSIS
A. The nonabandonment statute is not impermissibly
retroactive.
In 2005, the Montana Legislature amended the nonabandonment
statute to “create a presumption of nonabandonment for all water rights
claimed for municipal use.”31 Skinner argued that because the amendment
did not contain a retroactivity clause, as required by Montana law, it could
not be retroactively applied to this particular water rights claim dating
from the 1860s.32
The Court held that there was no retroactive application of the law
because the 2005 amendments were procedural, not substantive.33 Because
of this distinction, the Court held that the amendments fell outside of
Montana law, which states that unless expressly declared, none of the law
contained in any Montana statute is retroactive.34 The Court called
attention to the fact that it has continually held that “[a]lthough the general
rule of law [was] that a statute is not to be applied retroactively, an
exception to that rule [was] a change in a law that is merely procedural
rather than substantive.”35
The 2005 amendments changed the municipal abandonment
inquiry’s burden of proof, which is a procedural change, not substantive.36
The Court cited Royston, where the Court had affirmed that an amendment
to Montana law dealing with changing appropriation rights modified the
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procedural aspect, not the substantive law.37 Based on Royston, the Court
found the 2005 amendment only changed the assignment of the burden of
proof, not actual, vested water rights.38 This modification was procedural,
and not a substantive retroactive application of the law in violation of
Montana Code Annotated § 1-2-109.39
B. The Water Court did not err by reinstating 7.35 cfs of
Helena’s Tenmile Creek water rights.
The Water Court, using the nonabandonment statutory analysis,
determined that the City did not intend to abandon their 7.35 cfs water
right.40 To determine whether the Water Court’s findings were correct, the
Court made two determinations: (1) the Water Court’s findings as to the
nonabandonment statute’s application were not clearly erroneous;41 and
(2) Skinner had not successfully established an intent to abandon by the
City.42
The Court reiterated the general presumption behind abandonment in
water rights, stating that “abandonment of a water right requires both nonuse and intent to abandon.”43 The amended statute allows that if a water
right is claimed for municipal use by a city, it can be presumed to not be
abandoned, if a city has regularly maintained the systems for the “future
municipal use of the water right,” conducted a formal survey regarding
using the water right for municipal supply, or maintain the facilities for the
water system.44
Here, the Water Court found, and the parties did not dispute, the City
had “continuously and partially used each water right since the date of the
Decree.”45 The Court agreed with the Water Court’s findings and upheld
that “construction of the Rimini Pipeline established a presumption of
municipal nonabandonment.”46 The construction of the 1921 pipeline
established that the City intended to use the municipal water right in the
future, thus creating a presumption of nonabandonment required by the
nonabandonment statute.47 Furthermore, the Court found evidence to

37.
Id. ¶ 18 (citing Matter of Application for Change of
Appropriation Water Rights Nos. 101960-41S and 101967-41S by Royston, 249
Mont. 425, 816 P.2d 1054 (1991)).
38.
Id.
39.
Id. ¶ 22.
40.
Id. ¶ 32; see Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4) (2015).
41.
City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 26.
42.
Id. ¶ 26, 32.
43.
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added) (citing 79 Ranch v. Pitsch, 204 Mont.
426, 432, 666 P.2d 215, 218 (1983)).
44.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4) (2005).
45.
City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 24 (citing City of Helena v. Cmty.
of Rimini, Case No. 411-67, Mont. Water Court (2015) (hereinafter “Water
Court Decision”)).
46.
Id. ¶ 26.
47.
Id.
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satisfy the other statutory requirements of the nonabandonment statute.48
Specifically, the Court found that the City commissioned an engineering
report in 1929 that discussed a new transmission line to make full use of
the City’s water rights from Tenmile Creek to meet current needs and
future growth.49 The Court finally found that the City maintained the Yaw
Yaw ditch for other purposes, such as irrigation and emergency use, which
presumed nonabandonment even though it was not using the water rights
for the municipal water supply.50
The Court upheld the Water Court’s rejection of the Master’s
finding that Skinner had rebutted the presumption of nonabandonment.51
The Master had also determined that because the sixteen-inch transmission
lines could not carry the full capacity, due to leakages and other “losses
that the City could not have predicted when it constructed the pipelines in
1903,”52 this was non-use and the City had abandoned their rights to the
lost water.53 The Court found the Master’s determination on this point
erroneous and upheld the Water Court’s rejection.54 There is a
presumption of nonabandonment because the unplanned undersized
delivery system was not enough to demonstrate an intent to abandon.55
C. The City did not abandon 0.60 cfs of its Tenmile Creek water
rights.
The Master determined that because the actual capacity of the
Rimini Pipeline was less than the amount decreed, 13.15 cfs and 13.75 cfs
respectively, the City abandoned the difference of 0.60 cfs due to nonuse.56 The Water Court agreed.57 However, on appeal, the Court
recognized the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the nonabandonment
statute for municipalities: to recognize the “great and growing cities
doctrine.”58 Originating in Colorado, the doctrine supports cities’ planning
efforts for future water needs and “requires flexibility in such planning
efforts.”59 This doctrine allows a city to retain their water rights through
periods of non-use if the city “takes the affirmative steps prescribed by the
statute.”60 These affirmative steps include building a larger-capacity
pipeline or retaining the ditch for emergency purposes,61 as Helena did
with the Yaw Yaw ditch. Recognizing the Legislature’s intent to establish
48.
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City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 38.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-227(4)(a)-(g) (2015).

6

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

the growing communities doctrine when enacting the nonabandonment
statute, the Court found that though the City built a smaller pipeline
originally, it intended to build a larger one in the future, and thus is
presumed to not abandon its water rights.62
D. Dissent
Justice Rice, joined by Justice McKinnon and Justice Baker, dissented
from the majority’s holding. Justice Rice’s dissent disagreed with the
finding that the 2005 nonabandonment statute was not retroactive.63 The
dissent analyzed the history of water rights in Montana and the historical
significance of the beneficial use doctrine.64 Specifically, it cited many
Montana Supreme Court cases supporting the conclusion that “non-use, in
and of itself, [was] sufficient evidence to prove an intent to abandon.”65 It
cited many water rights adjudication decisions that established that
“because a water right is founded on application for a beneficial use, a
water right holder may lose the water right through abandonment.”66
The dissent argued that the majority’s reliance on Royston, finding
merely a procedural change, was misguided. Royston involved “purely a
shift of the burden of proof in a water case,”67 holding that the 1972
Constitution “[did] not include the right to not have to carry a burden of
proof.”68 Since Royston was not a substantive change in the law, the
retroactive requirement did not apply. However, the dissent argued that
the nonabandonment statute definitively changed the substantive law.69
The dissent contended that changing the favorable presumption for a city
when it only uses part of a water right changes the levels of proof from
city to challenger, “regardless of period of non-use.”70 According to the
dissent, this change is not a procedural change, but a substantive one that
is impermissibly retroactive and demands a different analysis for the
retroactive constitutionality of the statute.71
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rimini holding recognizes the “growing cities doctrine” of
western water law, maintaining cities’ water rights through extended
periods of nonuse if they meet certain statutory requirements. The City
62.
City of Helena, 388 Mont. at ¶ 39.
63.
Id. ¶ 47 (Rice, J., dissenting).
64.
Id. ¶¶ 49-53 (Rice, J., dissenting).
65.
Id. ¶ 53 (Rice, J., dissenting).
66.
Id. ¶ 52 (Rice, J., dissenting) (citing In re Adjudication of Water
Rights of Clark Fork River, 254 Mont. 11, 15-17, 833 P.2d 1120, 1123-24
(1992)).
67.
Id. ¶ 56 (Rice, J., dissenting).
68.
Id. ¶ 55 (Rice, J., dissenting).
69.
Id. ¶ 57 (Rice, J., dissenting).
70.
Id. ¶ 59 (Rice, J., dissenting).
71.
Id. ¶ 62 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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maintained a presumption of nonabandonment because it maintained
water supply systems, conducted formal studies regarding the water rights
and the municipal use, and maintained the facilities for emergency use.
Furthermore, the nonabandonment amendment was a procedural change
and not impermissible retroactive.

